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Bankers are often characterized as
being in the business of managing risk.
To be successful, bank managers,
stockholders, and directors must work
closely together in deciding what risks
their bank will assume and how they
will control the banks overall risk
exposure. Each of these participants,
though, is likely to have different pref-
erences and opinions regarding risk.
In fact, the development of bank risk-
management policies and procedures
typically involves bank owners, direc-
tors, and managers in a process of
give and take. Throughout this
process, differences in opinion may
arise because of differences in owner-
ship positions, responsibilities for
managing the bank, and management
oversight functions. Consequently, if
mutually acceptable decisions are to be
made, each decision maker will have to
understand the preferences of the oth-
ers and develop policies that reflect all
of their concerns.
Bank risk is also important from the
perspective of public policy because of
the corresponding risks to the pay-
ments system and financial stability.
Moreover, deposit insurance and the
federal safety net may provide incen-
tives for banks to take on additional
risk. Bank supervisors therefore focus
on how well banks manage risk. In
many cases, weaknesses in a banks
risk management practices can be
traced to weaknesses in its manage-
ment and ownership structure. Thus,
if a bank examiner is to suggest correc-
tive steps for a problem institution, the
examiner should also understand the
basic components of a sound manage-
ment and ownership structure.
This study examines the relationship
between ownership and management
structure and a banks risk exposure.
Previous research has addressed this
topic as well. This study, though, is
able to take a more comprehensive
look at the factors influencing bank
risk taking by examining the portion
of an owners or managers wealth that
is concentrated in bank stockholdings.
This variable provides new insights
into bank risk taking and helps clarify
the contribution of other factors.
In earlier work, we found ownership
and management structure to be an
important factor in the cost and profit
efficiency of a sample of Tenth Federal
Reserve District banks.1 The same
sample is used in this study to relate
ownership and management structure
to bank risk. The data reveal that own-
ership and wealth diversification of
bank owners and managers do influ-
ence bank risk. These effects extend
not only to the overall risk of the bank,
but are also reflected uniquely in asset
quality measures, bank leverage, and
other parts of a banks risk exposure.
The article first discusses how wealth,
ownership structure, and management
position might affect bank risk. It then
briefly reviews other studies of this
topic, describes the data used in this
study, and presents characteristics of
manager wealth and ownership at the
sample banks. We next present a simple
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Richard J. Sullivan and Kenneth R. Spongsheet risks, and overall risk of hired-
manager banks compared to owner-
manager banks. The core of the article
is then presented, which is a regres-
sion analysis of risk and ownership
structure.
The relationship between wealth,
ownership structure, and risk
Attitudes towards risk and the extent
that a person will accept risk will be
determined by a number of personal
characteristics. One important influ-
ence on risk taking is the extent to
which an individuals financial
wealth is diversified. Diversification
can reduce exposure to risk because
an investment with poor returns can
be offset by an investment with good
returns. As long as financial wealth
is diversified, an investor can be less
concerned with the riskiness of any
individual investment. But if the
investors wealth is highly concen-
trated in a particular investment,
then he or she would be more moti-
vated to monitor and control the
investment to reduce its risk.
Owners and managers face different
opportunities as well as personal
limitations that will influence the
amount of risk that they might accept.
Stockholders face a positive relation-
ship between risk and return to
investment projects, and must balance
their desire for added returns with
the desire to avoid risk. Stockholders
wishing to obtain higher returns may
want a business to operate with
higher levels of risk, while others are
willing to accept lower returns in
exchange for lower risk.
Managers must also grapple with the
level of risk and return appropriate to
the business they run. But managers
often have little ownership stake in
the business and therefore may not
have a direct claim on any added
profit earned by accepting added risk.
Without an assurance that they would
gain from accepting higher risk, the
managers may tend to avoid risky
investments. Moreover, much of the
background and training necessary to
do their jobs is specific to the business
for which they work, the value of
which would disappear if the manager
were employed elsewhere. As a result,
managers may be reluctant to take
additional risks, since they may tar-
nish their reputation and be out of a
job if their gambles fail.
These differences in risk behavior may
cause a conflict between business
owners and hired managers.2 Manag-
ers may operate the business in a less
risky manner than that desired by
owners. Thus, owners must devise
methods of encouraging managers to
take reasonable risks. One method is
to reward managers based on the prof-
itability of the business. As long as
profitability rises as the level of risk
rises, this would encourage managers
to take on added risk. However, such
incentive schemes are difficult to
design properly, and in some cases,
may cause managers to take on more
risk than owners desire. An alternative
is to give managers stock or stock
options, thus aligning their interests
with that of other owners and encour-
aging them to take more risks.
Another alternative is to monitor the
activities of managers. As representatives
of stockholders, the board of directors
performs the role of monitoring and con-
trolling the performance of management.
The board must design policies, proce-
dures, and compensation schemes that
ensure managers will act in the interest
of stockholders while operating the bank
in a safe and sound manner. Board
involvement may thus induce manag-
ers to take appropriate risks while
avoiding highly risky ventures. However,
this mechanism may not always be
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Theory of the Firm,
Journal of Political
Economy 88 (April
1980): 288-307.effective because careful monitoring
requires time and effort, and some
board members may not have suffi-
cient motivation to bear these costs.3
Thus, the extent to which directors
engage in monitoring and controlling
risk may be tied to their ownership
characteristics. Owners with a signifi-
cant share of ownership will be more
motivated to monitor the firm because
they largely benefit from the firms
good performance. However, the risk
preference of these owners will depend
on their wealth diversification, and as
their wealth becomes more concen-
trated in the banks stock, the bank
should have less risk.
Finally, there are unique aspects of
the banking industry that must also
be considered regarding owner and
manager attitudes towards risk. First,
banks are subject to supervision, and
a major objective of this supervision is
to ensure that banks are operated in
a safe and sound manner. Supervi-
sory agencies place this responsibility
on the banks management and board
of directors, so that bank managers
and directors need to be particularly
concerned with risk. Second, deposit
insurance and other elements of the
federal safety net may encourage
bank owners to take additional risk,
because a risky bank can attract
deposits from insured depositors who
would be unconcerned about the level
of risk in the bank.
To summarize, this study focuses on
three hypotheses regarding risk,
wealth, and ownership structure:
 As the managers or owners wealth
becomes more concentrated in the
banks stock, the bank should have
less risk.
 Because owners and non-owner man-
agers have differing risk preferences,
owner-managed and hired-manager
banks are likely to have different
levels of risk. Furthermore, because
non-owner managers are likely to
be more risk averse, an increase in
hired-manager ownership of the
bank should increase bank risk.
 Monitoring the performance of a
manager can assure appropriate
risk taking, but monitoring is a
costly activity and will depend on a
monitors motivation. Effective
monitors would likely have a sig-
nificant share of ownership. These
monitors risk preferences will de-
pend on their wealth diversification,
and as their wealth becomes more
concentrated in a banks stock, the
bank should have less risk.
Research on bank risk and
ownership structure
A number of studies examine the rela-
tion between bank risk and owner-
ship, and their findings have varied
considerably. According to different
studies, the relation between insider
ownership and the risk of banks is
sometimes positive, sometimes nega-
tive, sometimes U-shaped, and some-
times inverse U-shaped (more
information on these studies are in
Box 1, page 18). These inconsistent
results are due to a number of fac-
tors, such as different measures of
risk, different time periods for study,
and different methods for analyzing
the relation between ownership and
risk. Another possible reason for the
inconsistent results may be that none
of the studies had information on the
wealth of owners or managers.
The sample used in this study contains
information on the wealth of owners
and managers. The sample consists of
270 banks randomly selected from
state-chartered banks in the Tenth
Federal Reserve District.4 Bank
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Most studies that have related bank risk to ownership structure
have used measures of risk obtained from stock prices.1 In the
earliest of these studies, Saunders, et. al. (1990) examine the link
between bank ownership structure and risk taking in a sample of
38 large, publicly held bank holding companies. They use the
stock prices of the banks to obtain several measures of the capital
market risk of the bank holding companies. Their measure of
ownership structure was the combined share of outstanding stock
and stock options held by all of the managers and directors at a
bank. They found a higher level of risk in banks that had higher
levels of ownership by managers and directors.
A number of similar studies followed that of Saunders and his
coauthors by using risk measures derived from stock prices, but
results have been inconsistent. In a sample of 100 savings institu-
tions, Brewer and Saidenberg (1996) find a U-shaped relation
between risk and insider ownership, so that a positive relation
may occur only at higher levels of insider ownership. Knopf and
Teall (1996) investigate a sample of 300 savings institutions over
the period from 1987 to 1992. They find that the relation between
risk and insider ownership changed over time and argue that the
relationship may depend on the level of regulatory stringency
imposed on financial institutions. For the post-FIRREA period
(after 1989), they find a negative relation between insider owner-
ship and stock price risk. Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan
(1997) study a sample of 350 bank holding companies and find a
positive relation between risk and insider ownership, but only for
bank holding companies with a low franchise value. Chen, Steiner,
and Whyte (1998) find a negative relation between insider owner-
ship and risk in a sample of 302 banks and savings institutions.
Two studies look at risk in banks as measured by balance sheet
indicators. Gorton and Rosen (1995) use the mix of loans in a
sample of 456 bank holding companies to measure risk, and find
an inverse U-shaped relation between the proportion of risky
loans in the banks loan portfolio and insider ownership. Knopf
Box 1: Research on Bank Risk and Ownership Structure
1 Many studies of non-financial firms also show a relation between ownership structure
and risk. For examples, see Amihud and Lev (1981), Agrawal and Mandelker (1987),
Bagnani, et. al. (1994), and May (1995).19
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and Teall (1996) use such risk measures as real estate loans as a
proportion of total assets, the equity-to-asset ratio, and brokered
CDs as a proportion of total assets and find an inconsistent rela-
tion between insider ownership and risk.
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Box 1: Research on Bank Risk and Ownership Structure (continued)examination reports are our primary
source of data on wealth and owner-
ship among owners, directors, and
managers. Bank examiners collect and
report information on the number of
shares held by officers, directors, and
all major owners of the bank, the
responsibilities and compensation of
managers, and the net worth of all
the directors of the bank.5 Because a
banks chief executive officer or top
manager is typically on the board of
directors, the data set also contains
information on his or her net worth.
Ownership for the bank is identified
for the year 1994, and the same
major ownership group must have
controlled the bank from 1991 to
1994.6 Financial data come from
quarterly call reports for 1990 to
1994. More detail on the data can be
found in Box 2 on the facing page.
Wealth and ownership
characteristics of managers
Sample banks can be in one of two
groups, based on the ownership




is a member of the
ownership group
with the largest
stake in the bank.
In the sample, there
are 110 owner-
manager banks
(Table 1), and owner
managers on aver-
age held 37 percent
of the stock in their
bank. Other mem-
bers of the owner
managers family
often owned a sig-
nificant part of the
bank as well, and
the combined family
ownership in these
banks averaged 63 percent. The
owner-manager banks are a useful ref-
erence group because there should be
no conflict between their roles as own-
ers and managers.
A hired-manager bank is any bank not
in the owner-manager category, and
there are 160 hired-manager banks in
our sample (Table 1). For most of the
hired-manager banks, the manager
has little or no ownership stake: this
ownership share averages only 3 per-
cent.8 Moreover, including the mana-
gers family raises the average share to
only 4 percent. In a portion of the
hired-manager banks, the managers
ownership is more substantial32 of
the banks have managers with an
ownership of 5 percent or greater, with
a maximum of 39 percent (not shown
in Table 1). In all of these banks, how-
ever, at least one other owner has a
larger share of the bank. The hired-
manager banks are an important focus
of this study because of the hired
managers potential for risk averse











is for internal use by
bank supervisors and
is not part of the
examination report that





of bank common stock.






ownership of shares in
the holding company
plus any additional
bank shares that might
be owned directly.
7 We identify the
manager as the person
that examiners list as
responsible on a daily
basis for directing the
operations of the bank.
In most, but not all,
cases this was the
president or CEO.
8 Often the ownership
was in shares
necessary for the
manager to qualify as a
member of the board of
directors.
Manager ownership and net worth





Number of Banks 110 160
Manager Characteristics
Personal Ownership of Bank*** 37% 3%
Personal plus Family Ownership of Bank*** 63% 4%
Personal Net Worth (millions)*** $1.719 $0.472
Investment in Bank / Personal Net Worth+,*** 86% 21%
Notes: The sample consists of 270 state-chartered banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District.
The statistics are unweighted averages.
+ Investment in bank = number of shares personally held in bank´ book value of equity per share.
*, **, *** indicate significant difference between owner-manager and hired-manager banks at the 10%,
5%, or 1% significance level. Statistical difference based on a t-test for a difference in means.
Table 121
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Ownership data come from a unique data set that was compiled from
bank examination reports, and the financial variables are taken from call
report information. The sample of banks is from the Tenth Federal
Reserve District. To be considered for this sample, a bank had to be in
existence for at least five years prior to 1990 and remained in existence
through 1994. A bank also had to be a full-service bank, offering loans,
holding insured deposits, and generating noninterest income. All of the
banks had to have a complete set of financial data. A total of 1,421 banks
met these criteria.
As the second step of the data selection process, we randomly chose 304
state-chartered banks from the group of banks identified in the first step.
The data set on management and ownership was constructed by tran-
scribing data from state agency, FDIC, and Federal Reserve examination
reports of state-chartered banks. The sample size was limited to 304
banks because of the labor required to collect this examination data.
Since data on ownership structure and wealth of directors were readily
available for state-chartered banks, the sample only included this charter
class. Exam reports have information on responsibilities, age, tenure and
compensation of bank officers; ownership, net worth, responsibilities, age,
tenure and compensation of members of the boards of directors; owner-
ship information on all major owners of the bank; family relationships
among officers and stockholders; and information on policymaking
responsibilities in the bank. On occasion we supplemented and verified
this data through a number of other sources, including Federal Reserve
bank holding company inspection reports and annual reports to the Fed-
eral Reserve filed by bank holding companies.
In general, the ownership information comes from 1994 examination
reports, although some 1993 reports were used when the 1994 report was
unavailable. Our measures of the overall risk of the banks (the standard
deviation of adjusted net income and the survival likelihood index) use
quarterly data from the five-year period from 1990 to 1994. In order to
match risk performance and ownership structure over this period, we
excluded any bank that underwent a significant ownership change in
1991, 1992, or 1993.1
A few banks had to be excluded because of information problems.
Twenty-seven banks were excluded because they experienced a significant
ownership change (that is, the majority ownership of the bank changed
hands). Missing data and other problems reduced the initial sample by
another seven banks, so that the final sample included 270 banks.
Finally, the data used in the regressions reported below used 267 obser-
vations because financial data were missing from some sample banks.
Box 2: Details on Sample Data
1 If a bank had an ownership change in 1994, data on the 1993 ownership structure was
used.if they act in their own interest rather
than that of owners.
Information on net worth and bank
investment relative to net worth
shows that, compared to hired man-
agers, the average owner manager is
wealthier and has more wealth con-
centrated in the bank. The average
net worth of owner managers is
$1.719 million, compared to $0.472
million for hired managers (Table 1).
Wealth concentration in the bank is
calculated as the ratio of ones
investment in the bank to personal
net worth, with investment in the
bank equal to the number of shares
of common stock held times the book
value of bank capital per share.9 For
owner managers, this wealth concen-
tration averages 86 percent, while for
hired managers, it averages 21 percent
(Table 1)10 For the majority of hired-
managers, the ratio is under 20 per-
cent (Chart 1). By contrast, Chart 1
shows that a ratio greater than 20 per-
cent is the rule for owner-manager
banks.11
These ratios and their distribution
across individual managers have a
number of implications for bank risk
taking. When an owner-managers
wealth is well diversified, we expect
owner-managed banks to be run in a
riskier fashion than hired-manager
banks. In a number of the sample
banks, owner managers are well diver-
sified, as Chart 1 shows. But Chart 1
also shows that owner-manager wealth
is often highly concentrated in their
banks, which could lead them to run
22
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9 Few of the banks had
stock that was actively
traded, so book value
was used as a simple
proxy for the value of









10 This ratio may be
subject to measurement
error, since a great deal
of time may not be
spent in preparing or
verifying the accuracy
of some of the director
net worth statements.
Also, book value is only
a proxy for the actual
value of investment in
the bank. Overall,
though, these ratios
should provide a good
general guide to the
wealth concentration of
the major players in a
banks operations.
11 If the manager or the
holding company used
debt financing in pur-
chasing the bank, then
our wealth concentra-
tion ratios could be
overstated and even
exceed one because we
did not adjust the bank
investment measure for
any underlying debt.
On the other hand,
lenders often ask major
stockholders to person-
ally guarantee their
bank stock debt, which
would suggest that
more of their wealth
could be at stake than
just their investment in
the bank. Underreport-
ing of net worth could
also lead to wealth
concentration ratios
above one.


































lead them to accept
higher levels of risk.
These differences
suggest that we




tion to get a com-
plete picture of how
the characteristics
of managers influ-
ence risk at a
bank.12
Owner-manager





banks in this sam-
ple (Table 2). Aver-





banks. Eighty-one percent of
owner-managed banks are in non-
metropolitan areas, compared to 72
percent for hired-manager banks.
Both return on average assets and
return on equity in 1994 were higher
for hired-manager banks than for
owner-manager banks. This is also
true when we calculate average
ROAA and ROE for the period from
1990 to 1994, although the difference
for average ROAA is not statistically
significant.
An alternative measure of profitabil-
ity, and one more relevant for the
study of risk, is operating net income.
Operating net income is net income
before taxes, securities gains or los-
ses, and extraordinary items.
Operating net income is a better
reflection of a banks business risk
because business risk is determined
by the variability of the demand for
the banks product and services,
interest rate volatility, and the flexibil-
ity of the banks asset and liability
management.13 Operating net income
focuses on the core business of the
bank and eliminates fluctuations in
income from variables that can be
manipulated on a short-run basis. As
Table 2 shows, hired-manager banks
have a higher average value of operat-
ing return on average assets com-
pared to owner-manager banks.
23
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Basic characteristics of sample banks
(Variables with statistically different values are shown in bold type.)
Table 2
Owner-Manager Banks Hired-Manager Banks
Basic information
Number of Banks 110 160
AssetsAverage (millions), 1994** $38.6 $56.7
AssetsMedian (millions), 1994 $26.3 $30.8
LocationPercent nonmetropolitan* 81% 72%
Net income
Return on Average Assets (ROAA), 1994* 1.016% 1.138%
Average ROAA, 1990-1994 1.077% 1.132%
Return on Equity (ROE), 1994** 10.46% 12.33%
Average ROE, 1990-1994* 11.47% 12.47%
Operating net income+
Operating ROAA+, 1994* 1.461% 1.619%
Average Operating ROAA+, 1990-1994 1.428% 1.519%
Operating ROE+, 1994** 14.93% 17.63%
Average Operating ROE+, 1990-1994* 15.16% 17.05%
Notes: The sample consists of 270 state-chartered banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District.
The statistics are unweighted averages or median values for sample banks. Statistics covering the period from 1990 to 1994 are
calculated from quarterly data.
*, **, *** indicate significant difference between owner-manager and hired-manager banks at the 10%, 5%, or 1% significance level.
Statistical difference based on a t-test for a difference in means or a rank-order test for a difference in medians.
+Operating net income measures profitability of banking operations, and is defined as net income + taxes + extraordinary Items  securities
gains or losses. Operating ROAA = operating net income / average assets, and operating ROE = operating net income/
equity capital.
12 There is a positive
correlation between
ownership and the ratio
of bank investment to
personal net worth. The
correlation is .944 for
hired-manager banks,
although if you only con-
sider hired managers
with an ownership stake
over 1 percent, the corre-
lation drops to .531. For
owner-manager banks,
the correlation is only
.441. The relatively low
correlation implies that
there can be consider-
able error in assuming
that a higher percentage
of ownership also im-
plies less diversification
of wealth.
13 Joseph F. Sinkey,
Jr., Commercial BankTo gain insight into the range of risks
that a bank must control, we studied
a number of measures of bank risk,
and this section of the article intro-
duces these risk measures. This sec-
tion also compares the values of the
risk measures at owner-managed
banks with those for hired-manager
banks to analyze the effect of man-
agement structure on risk. This
comparison yields some interesting
features of risk-taking and manage-
ment structure, but is incomplete
and sometimes contradictory. These
contradictions occur because
underlying characteristics of hired-
and owner-manager banks, such as
wealth diversification, asset size, and
location, each have their own effect
on bank risk. Tables 1 and 2 show
that these underlying characteristics
can be very different
across banks. The next





other factors that affect
bank risk, and will
reconcile any contradic-
tions uncovered in this
section.
Credit risk. The first set
of risk measures exam-
ines a banks exposure to
risk through its lending
activities. The loan port-
folio is a major source of
risk that the board of
directors and manage-
ment control by estab-
lishing policies regard-
ing lending limits for
loan officers, limiting the
loan-to-asset ratio, and
limiting credit concen-
trations among industries, loan cate-
gories, or geographic locations. Senior
management and the board of direc-
tors may also approve major loans as
an added level of control.
Compared to hired-manager banks,
owner-managed banks have a higher
level of risk in their loan portfolios, as
reflected in higher rates of loan losses,
higher levels of past due loans, and
higher ratios of noncurrent assets to
the loan loss reserve (see Table 3).
These differences are due to a number
of different factors. Owner managers
may be willing to set less conservative
standards for acceptable loans because
they can benefit from the higher
expected return associated with riskier
loans. Hired managers may set more
conservative standards because bad
loans are highly visible, and hired
managers may want to avoid reporting








Manager ownership and credit risk
(Variables with statistically different values are shown in bold type.)
Year-end 1994
Table 3
Owner-Manager Banks Hired-Manager Banks
Total Loans / Total Assets 51.90% 54.80%
Net Loan Losses / Total Loans* 0.227% 0.157%
Nonperforming Assets / Total Loans** 1.360% 0.807%
Past Due Loans / Total Loans* 2.818% 2.093%
Noncurrent Assets / Total Assets* 0.929% 0.616%
Allowance for Loan Losses / Total Loans 1.866% 1.899%
Provision for Loan Losses / Total Loans 0.193% 0.216%
Other Real Estate Owned / Total Assets 0.236% 0.162%
Noncurrent Assets / Allowance for Loan Losses * 114% 65%
Notes: The sample consists of 270 state-chartered banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District. Statistics are unweighted
averages. Nonperforming assets = loans that do not accrue interest plus loans that are past due by 90 days or longer. Past due
loans = loans that do not accrue interest plus loans that are past due by 30 days or longer. Noncurrent assets = nonperforming
assets plus other real estate owned.
*, ** indicate significant difference between owner-manager and hired-manager banks at a 10% or 5% significance level. Statistical
difference based on a t-test for a difference in means.
Risk characteristics of owner-




have much of their
personal wealth at stake
in their bank and might
be expected to control
credit risk more carefully
than hired managers.
This latter effect is
important, as will be
seen in the next section.
However, considering
this risk in isolation, the
net effect of all the
determinants of credit
risk is to leave owner-
manager banks in our
sample with more credit
risk, on average, compared
to hired-manager banks.
Other balance sheet
risk. Banks must also
control risk associated
with other balance sheet
items. The bank is
exposed to risk associ-
ated with access to funds, commit-
ments to the cost of fixed assets, and
interest rate fluctuations. Bank man-
agers and owners must also make a
fundamental decision about how
much equity to hold in the bank. This
decision is important because equity
provides a cushion to absorb loan
losses or unexpected drops in net
income.
We find that owner-manager banks
have lower levels of other balance
sheet risk compared to hired-manager
banks. Sample data show that
owner-manager banks have higher
levels of capitalization and lower lev-
els of operating leverage and market
(interest rate) risk compared to
hired-manager banks (see Table 4).
This result, which is somewhat at
variance with measures of credit risk,
may reflect the concentration of
wealth that owner managers have in
their bank and the interest this will
give them in the long-run stability of
their banks. Additional determinants
of other balance sheet risk also play a
role, as we will see in the next section
of the article.
Overall risk. Because higher risk in
the loan portfolio is offset to some
extent by lower risk in other balance
sheet accounts for owner-manager
banks (and vice-versa for hired-
manager banks), it is useful to exam-
ine measures of the overall risk of the
bank. The commonly used market-
based measures of bank risk (such as
fluctuations in stock returns) are
unavailable for this study because
most of the sample banks do not have
publicly traded common stock.14
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Manager ownership and other balance sheet risk
(Variables with statistically different values are shown in bold type.)
Year-end 1994
Table 4
Owner-Manager Banks Hired-Manager Banks
Capitalizationleverage risk
Equity / Total Assets** 10.18% 9.36%
Operating leveragefixed asset risk
Premises and Fixed Assets / Total Assets** 1.133% 1.419%
Non-core funding risk
Non-core Liabilities / Total Deposits1 10.24% 10.83%
Market riskinterest rate risk
Absolute value (Asset-Liability Mismatch / Total Assets)**,2 13.48% 16.47%
Notes: The sample consists of 270 state-chartered banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District. Statistics are unweighted averages
for sample banks.
*, ** indicate significant difference between owner-manager and hired-manager banks at a 10% or 5% significance level. Statistical
difference based on a t-test for a difference in means.
1 Non-core liabilities include time deposits or certificates of deposits over $100,000, federal funds purchased, repurchase
agreements, and foreign deposits.
2 The asset-liability mismatch measures the gap between short-term (under one year) assets and liabilities. We calculate gap by
subtracting fixed and floating rate short-term deposits (both time and certificates of deposits) from fixed and floating rate short-term
earning assets (loans and securities). Risk rises as the absolute value of the gap rises, because the banks earnings are then
subject to greater fluctuations due to changes in interest rates.
14 Only five of the
banks in the study
are in banking
organizations that have
stock traded on major
exchanges.Instead, accounting-based measures
of risk will serve as a substitute.15
The first measure we consider is
variation in income.16 A bank with
risky loans and investments will be
more likely to experience large gains
and losses, which will be reflected in
extensive income variability. Table 5
shows information on the variation of
income, as measured by the variation
in total revenue or the variation in
operating return on assets. Hired-
manager banks have greater variation
in income compared to owner-
managed banks, although the differ-
ence is not statistically significant.
A second measure of overall risk is a
banks survival likelihood index.
While income fluctuations are impor-
tant indicators of the riskiness of a
bank, their ability to measure risk is
incomplete. A bank may have a
stable income stream, but it could be
more risky than some other banks
due to lower levels of average profit-
ability or less capital protection.
Income fluctuation, capitalization, and
average profitability combine in a
number of different ways to produce a
unique level of risk. In the results pre-
sented above, the average owner-
manager bank was less profitable
compared to hired-manager banks,
which implies more risk, but had a
higher capital-to-asset ratio and lower
fluctuations in income, both of which
imply less risk. An advantage to the
survival likelihood index as a measure
of risk is that it incorporates all three of
these factors together.17
The survival likelihood index is defined as
The higher the value of the survival
likelihood index, the lower the risk of
the bank. An increase in the capital-
26
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Manager ownership and measures of overall bank risk
(Variables with statistically different values are shown in bold type.)
Owner-Manager Banks Hired-Manager Banks
Income variation
Standard Deviation of Total Revenue / Average Assets .286% .340%
Standard Deviation of Operating Return on Average Assets .787% .842%
Survival likelihood index+
(Equity/Assets + Average operating ROAA++)/
Standard Deviation of operating ROAA 20.58 18.96
Notes: The sample consists of 270 state-chartered banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District.
Statistics are calculated from quarterly data for the period from 1990 to 1994, and are unweighted averages for sample banks.
*, **, *** indicate significant difference between owner-manager and hired-manager banks at least at a 10%, 5%, or 1% significance level.
Statistical difference based on the Wilcoxon test for a difference rank order of the data.
+ The survival likelihood index measures the number of standards deviations that ROAA or operating ROAA would need to fall in order to
exhaust equity and force a bank failure. A large value of the survival likelihood index implies low risk, that is, the larger the value of the
index the lower the probability of bank failure.
++ Operating net income measures profitability of banking operations, and is defined as net income + taxes + extraordinary items 
Securities Gains or Losses. Operating ROAA = (operating net income) / (average assets).
Table 5
15 Research has shown




























16 Variation in income
is measured using the
standard deviation of
income over the 20
quarters in the period
from 1990 to 1994.
17 The index is based
on the Z score in John
H. Boyd and Stanley L.
Graham, Bank Holding
Company Risk,








the number of standard
deviations below the
mean that operating
return on assets would
have to fall in order to
eliminate capital.
capital-to-asset ratio
+ average value of operating return on assets
standard deviation of operating return
on assets.to-asset ratio would raise the index,
as would an increase in the mean
value of operating return on assets,
both of which imply less risk. A rise
in the standard deviation of operating
return on assets would lower the
index, which implies more risk.
A second advantage is that the sur-
vival likelihood index can be viewed
as a measure of the likelihood of fail-
ure. The smaller the value of the sur-
vival likelihood index, the more likely
a bank will fail. This is of particular
importance to stockholders and regu-
lators since bank failure will wipe out
a stockholders investment, while
exposing the bank insurance fund to
loss.18 Table 5 shows that the survival
likelihood index is higher for owner-
manager banks, although the differ-
ence is not statistically significant.
Thus the differences in profitability,
capitalization, and income fluctua-
tions combine into a slightly higher
survival likelihood index for owner-
managed banks.
A regression analysis of bank
risk, ownership structure, and
manager wealth
Dividing banks into owner-manager
and hired-manager categories captures
a notable difference in the managers
ownership status but is a crude
method for understanding the many
variables that can influence bank
risk. The differences in risk revealed
in Tables 3, 4, and 5 reflect not only
the managers ownership status, but
also other underlying characteristics,
such as the managers wealth
diversification, the amount of
ownership of the hired manager, the
wealth diversification of the major
owners of hired-manager banks, and
the size and location of the bank. A
clear understanding of how bank
risk responds to differences in
ownership structure, wealth diversifi-
cation, and other characteristics
requires that their effects be
accounted for simultaneously.
Multiple regression provides the
appropriate statistical tool for this
type of analysis. We specify an equa-
tion that makes risk a mathematical
function of several explanatory vari-
ables: the managers ratio of bank
investment to personal net worth, the
ownership share of the hired manager
(when the bank has a hired manager),
and a monitors ratio of bank invest-
ment to personal net worth (for
hired-manager banks only). In this
equation, the monitor is defined as
the director who holds the most
shares of any director and is also a
member of the largest ownership
group. The equation also includes
variables to indicate the asset size of
the bank and whether the bank is in
a nonmetropolitan location.
The regression technique allows us to
estimate the function and see how risk
responds to an individual explanatory
variable after accounting for the
other explanatory variables. For
example, we can estimate the change
in risk associated with a change in
the ownership of a hired manager,
while holding the other explanatory
variables at certain, specified values.
As a result, we will have a cleaner
measure of how changes in hired
manager ownership might affect risk
or how changes in any of the other
variables might affect risk separately.
We estimate the regression equation
using all of the measures described
above for credit risk, other balance
sheet risk, and overall bank risk. In
order to focus the following discussion
on essential results, technical details
of the analysis are in an appendix. To
illustrate the results, we present graphs
for various risk measures plotted
against various explanatory variables.19
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18 Boyd and Graham
(1989), pp. 221-2,
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the same information










findings favor the use
of [a survival likelihood
index]computed with
accounting data.
19 The graphs use
estimated regression
equations and assumed
values for variables as
specified in each figure.Wealth concentration. Under our
first hypothesis, managers and own-
ers are assumed to become more
conservative as more of their wealth
becomes tied up in the bank. For
both hired and owner managers, this
relationship appears to be true
across a wide range of risk measures.
The managers ratio of bank invest-
ment to personal net worth is statis-
tically significant in explaining asset
quality (as measured by the ratios of
net loan losses to total loans, non-
performing assets to total loans, past
due loans to total loans, and noncur-
rent assets to total assets; see Table
A1.1).20 Estimates show that as a
manager has more of his or her
wealth concentrated in the bank,
asset quality improves, suggesting
that the manager is reducing the
risk in the loan portfolio.
Owner managers typically have a
much higher concentration of wealth
in their bank investment compared
to hired managers, and by itself, this
would imply a lower average credit
risk in owner-managed banks. Table
3, however, shows that the average
hired-manager bank had lower levels
of credit risk. The apparent contradic-
tion is because other factors that influ-
ence credit risk are not equal across
owner- and hired-manager banks, and
the differences are sufficient to cause
average credit risk to be higher at
owner-managed banks.
The managers ratio of bank invest-
ment to personal net worth is also
statistically significant in explain-
ing the equity-to-asset ratio (Table
A2) and the survival likelihood
index (Table A3). As the managers
concentration of wealth in the bank
rises, the equity-to-asset ratio rises
and the survival likelihood ratio
rises, thus indicating a decline in
risk.
Chart 2 illustrates how the rate of loan
losses, the equity-to-asset ratio, and the
survival likelihood index each responds
to changes in wealth concentration.21
Other factors held constant, risk declines
as the managers wealth becomes more
concentrated in the banks stock for all
three measures of risk.
Hired managers and their owner-
ship. In our second hypothesis, hired
managers are assumed to be more risk
averse than otherwise comparable
owner managers. Our regression
results show that banks with hired
managers have lower credit risk as
reflected in lower rates of loan losses,
nonperforming assets, past due loans,
and noncurrent assets (see the hired
manager indicator variable, Table
A1.1). One reason hired managers may
be avoiding risky loans is because
reporting bad loans to the banks
board of directors is a highly visible
blemish on the performance record of
the manager. Moreover, a hired-
manager could also be concerned
about a reputation for making bad
loans because it might have implica-
tions for the managers future job
prospects. In contrast to owner man-
agers, who are committed to their own
bank, a hired manager may have aspi-
rations to move to other banks as pro-
fessional opportunities arise.
A lower level of credit risk at hired-
manager banks may further indicate
conflict between the risk preferences
of hired managers and bank owners.
As we argued above, stock ownership
on the part of a hired-manager may
overcome the tendency for the man-
ager to avoid risk. The regression
results suggest that this is true with
regard to net loan losses, noncurrent
assets, bank equity, variation of
operating earnings, and the survival
likelihood index.22 In each of these
cases, an increase in a hired managers
ownership is associated with greater
28
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20 The managers ratio
of bank investment to





21 Panels A, B, and C
of Chart 2 are based on
regression equations
(2), (10), and (16) from
Appendix Tables A1.1,
A2, and A3.
22 See the variable for
ownership share of
hired manager in
regressions (2), (5), (10),
(15) and (16) in Tables
A1.1, A2, and A3.29
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Chart 2
Note: Calculations assume the monitors investment relative to net worth is 50%, the bank has $50 million in assets,, and is in a nonmetro-
politan area. In Panels A, B, and C, calculations assume that the hired manager owns, respectively, 20.5%, 6.7%, or 4.8% of the bank. The
survival likelihood index is defined as (equity / assets + average operating ROAA) / standard deviation of operating ROAA.risk. Chart 3 illustrates this effect:
holding other variables constant,
credit risk rises (as reflected in the
rate of net loan losses) and the sur-
vival likelihood index falls, as the
hired managers ownership in the
bank increases.23
Monitors wealth concentration.
Under our third hypothesis, indi-
viduals in a position to monitor
hired managers should influence
bank risk in accordance with their
investment concentration in the
bank. Results show that the monitors
ratio of bank investment to personal
net worth is positively related to the
equity-to-asset ratio and to the sur-
vival likelihood index, and negatively
related to variation in total revenue.24
Thus as bank monitors have more of
their wealth tied up in the bank, they




Note: Calculations assume the monitors investment relative to net worth is 50%, the bank has $50 million in assets, is in a nonmetropolitan
area, and bank investment/personal net worth for the manager is .5. The survival likelihood index is defined as (equity / assets + average
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23 Panels A and B of
Chart 3 are based on
regressions (2) and (16)
of Table A1.1 and A3.
24 See the variable for
monitors bank
investment/net worth
in regressions (10), (14),
and (16) of Tables A2
and A3.that managers and the bank are
allowed to assume. Chart 4 illustrates
this effect.25 When the ratio of the
monitors bank investment to per-
sonal net worth is .10, the equity-to-
asset ratio would be roughly one per-
centage point below comparable
owner-managed banks. If the ratio of
the monitors bank investment to net
worth rises to .60, the equity-to-asset
ratio would be at a higher level,
implying not only less risk, but also
an equity-to-asset ratio close to that
of comparable owner-managed
banks.
The effect of the monitors wealth
concentration on the equity-to-asset
ratio helps to explain why hired-
manager banks, on average, have a
lower equity-to-asset ratio compared
to owner-manager banks (see Table
4). Among hired-manager banks, the
monitors investment in the bank
relative to personal net worth averages
51 percent, while Table 1 shows that
the figure for owner managers is 86
percent. Thus, the wealth of the
major owners of hired-manager
banks is more diversified than that of
owner managers. As a result, the
lower ratio of equity to assets among
hired-manager banks seen in Table 4
is not due solely to the managers
ownership status, but also due to the
wealth diversification of the major
owner of the bank (and to other
underlying characteristics).
Since the monitor is a major owner
and is also on the board of directors,
he or she has the power to influence
the financial position of the bank.
Our results show that much of this
influence is reflected in the equity-
to-asset ratio, fluctuations in total
income, and the banks survival like-
lihood index. The results did not
show that this monitoring individual
had as strong of an influence over
credit risk in the bank, which may
indicate a lesser involvement in daily
credit decisions.
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Chart 4
Note: The monitor is defined as the director who holds the most shares of any director and is also a member of the largest ownership
group. Calculations assume that the hired manager owns 10% of the bank, bank investment / net worth for the hired manager is .2, the
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25 Chart 4 is based on
regression (10) of Table
A2.Location and bank size. Our
results suggest that banks in non-
metropolitan areas are less risky
compared to those in metropolitan
areas. Banks in nonmetropolitan areas
had lower loan loss rates, lower rates
of noncurrent assets, lower holdings
of other real estate owned, higher
equity-to-asset ratios, lower ratios of
premises and fixed assets to total
assets, and a higher survival likeli-
hood index, all of which suggest less
risk for nonmetropolitan banks.26
Our results show that bank size was
either insignificant or had conflicting
influences on bank risk. Results did
not show that there was a relation-
ship between asset size and credit
risk (Tables A1.1 and A1.2). Other
risk measures were sometimes posi-
tively and sometimes negatively
related to bank size (Tables A2 and
A3), and so it may be best to turn to
an overall measure of bank risk to
summarize these conflicting results.
A good summary measure is provided
by the survival likelihood index. Our
results show that the survival likeli-
hood index increases with asset size,
as illustrated in Chart 5.27 The figure
also shows that the relationship is not
linear, with the curve becoming flatter
at higher asset sizes. Thus, banks that
grow from $10 million to $15 million
in assets will have a larger increase in
the survival likelihood index than
banks that grow from $95 million to
$100 million in assets.
Summary and conclusions
Controlling risk in banks is a challeng-
ing responsibility, but the task can be
made easier through an understand-
ing of how ownership structure and
the diversification of wealth influences
the risk preferences and risk-taking
behavior of bank managers and owners.
This study looks at a sample of Tenth
Federal Reserve District banks to exam-
ine the relationship between bank risk,




Note: Calculations assume the bank investment/personal net worth for the manager is .5, the hired-manager owns 0% of the bank, the
monitors bank investment/personal net worth is .88, and the bank is in a nonmetropolitan area. The survival likelihood index is defined as
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tables. Counter to these
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27 Chart 5 is based on
regression (16) of Table
A3.and the degree to which managers
and owners have their wealth concen-
trated in their bank stockholdings.
The major results are that:
 Concentration of financial wealth
in the bank has a clear role in
determining bank risk: banks are
less risky when bank managers
(whether he or she is a hired or an
owner manager) have a higher con-
centration of wealth in their bank.
This effect is multifaceted, through
impacts on credit risk, the equity-
to-asset ratio, variation in earnings,
and average profitability (as reflected
in the survival likelihood index).
 Hired managers typically operate
their banks with lower credit risk
than banks with owner managers,
reflecting the different incentives
that these managers face. Stock
ownership by hired managers can
provide an incentive to bring the level
of credit risk in their bank closer to
that of owner-manager banks.
 Active monitoring by an owner or
director can guide hired-manager
banks towards a level of risk
desired by bank owners.
Because of these combined effects,
there is no simple way to characterize
whether a hired-manager bank is
likely to be more or less risky com-
pared to an owner-managed bank.
Credit risk may be higher at owner-
manager banks, but owner managers
often take steps to offset this risk,
such as holding more capital in the
bank. Results of this study do, how-
ever, allow some generalizations:
 owner-manager banks tend to be
more risky when the owners wealth
is well-diversified; and
 hired-manager banks tend to be
more risky when the hired manager
has a significant ownership stake
in the bank but has wealth that is
well-diversified, and where any
major owners that are likely to ful-
fill a monitoring role have wealth
that is highly diversified.
These results have implications for
trends in the banking industry and
for the risk-focused examination
process. Consolidation will have a
profound effect on the ownership
structure of the banking industry by
reducing the proportion of owner-
managed banks relative to hired-
manager banks and by creating larger
banks with more diversified investors.
According to the results of this study,
more hired managers could cause the
level of risk in bank loan portfolios to
fall, but this lower credit risk may be
offset by higher risks in other aspects
of a banks operations. Diversified
investors with smaller blocks of stock
in larger banks could mean that other
risk control mechanisms will become
more important, such as managerial
compensation schemes, boards of
directors, and equity markets. Bank
examiners and supervisors need to be
aware of management and ownership
structures that could lead to exces-
sive risk takingsuch as a bank
where major owners have diversified
wealth and where other control
mechanisms are weak.
For individual banks, results of this
study show that ownership structure
and concentration of wealth in bank
equity have significant influence on
bank risk. Understanding how risk
preferences depend on ownership and
wealth diversification can be valuable
information to managers and owners
as they grapple with the level and
type of risk to take in their banks.
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Specification
The statistical model is designed to test hypotheses related to the
effect of ownership structure and diversification of wealth on bank
risk. The basic statistical model makes bank risk a function of char-
acteristics of ownership and management and two control variables:
Risk Measure=f(managers bank investment/personal net worth,
hired manager indicator variable,
ownership share of hired manager,
monitors bank investment/net worth ´
hired manager indicator variable,
nonmetropolitan indicator variable,
assets, assets squared)
The first and second hypotheses discussed above (p. 17) suggests
that the relation between risk and a managers bank investment/
personal net worth should be negative, while the relation between
risk and the ownership share of hired managers should be positive.
Because of the differences in the preferences towards risk between
owners and hired-managers, monitoring of hired-managers can be
an important influence on bank risk taking. To account for this
aspect of hired-manager banks, we had to identify a person who
would most likely take on the responsibility of monitoring the banks
manager. We chose the director who holds the most shares of any
director and is also a member of the largest ownership group.1 For
this monitor, we calculate the value of his or her investment in the
bank relative to personal net worth. Among hired-manager banks,
the average value of the monitors bank investment relative to per-
sonal net worth was 51 percent. As this variable rises, and the
monitors wealth becomes less diversified, we would expect to see the
monitor become more risk averse and more interested in limiting
bank risk taking.
The regression equation also includes variables for the banks loca-
tion and size. Location is measured by whether or not the bank is in
a nonmetropolitan area. Banks in metropolitan areas face a different
market for loans compared to banks in nonmetropolitan areas. Mar-
ket characteristics can influence the mix of loans that a bank can
Appendix: Regression Analysis of Risk, Ownership Structure, and Manager
and Ownership Wealth
1 We also considered two other definitions of monitor: the director who holds the most
shares of any director regardless of belonging to the largest ownership group and the chair
of the board of directors. The results using these individuals as potential monitors are not
statistically significant in the regression equations and are not presented here.35
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make, and since different types of loans have different risks, location
can influence the amount of risk at a bank. Bank size may also
influence risk, since larger banks often have more opportunities to
diversify their loans and investments and thus lower portfolio risk.
While banks can have some control over their loan mix and asset
size, for many of the banks in our sample the degree of control is
limited. Location and asset size are included in the regression equa-
tion in order to account for some factors influencing risk that are
beyond the control of bank management.
Tests revealed that the error terms for regressions with raw values of
the standard deviation of earnings or the survival likelihood index
were not normally distributed. A log transformation of these depend-
ent variables corrected this problem (Table A3 has the results). In
these equations we used the log of assets (rather than assets and
assets-squared) to allow for a potential nonlinear relation between
the dependent variables and asset size.
We experimented with the variable managers bank investment/net
worth for appropriate functional forms. First, we looked for a non-
linear relationship by entering the variable as a set of dummy vari-
ables. Results did not suggest that this specification was superior to
entering managers bank investment/net worth as a continuous
variable. We also looked for a nonlinear relation by making the risk
measure a quadratic function of managers bank investment/net
worth (by entered the variable itself and the variable squared). We
did find instances where the squared term was statistically signifi-
cant, and these are presented in the results. Finally, the variable
managers bank investment/net worth was interacted with the
hired-manager indicator variable to see if risk responded to this vari-
able differently for hired managers compared to owner managers. In
no instance, however, were these additional terms significant
(results are available upon request).
Estimation method and issues
The model equation was estimated using ordinary least squares regres-
sion. Tests for heteroscedasticity revealed a problem only when the
ratio of volatile liabilities to total deposits was the dependent variable.
To correct, we used Whites heteroscedastic-consistent standard
error in regression (12) of Table A2.2
Appendix: Regression Analysis of Risk, Ownership Structure, and Manager
and Ownership Wealth (continued)
2 Hal White, A Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test
for Heteroscedasticity, Econometrica 48 (1980): 817-38.36
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In this formulation, a measure of risk is the dependent variable,
which implies that risk adjusts to ownership characteristics. Others
have argued that ownership structure adjusts to the risk of a firm or
industry, where closer ownership control may be expected in riskier
environments.3 In the case of banking, however, financial portfolios
are relatively flexible compared to ownership structure. As Saunders
and his coauthors note, the transaction cost of changing ownership
structure would be large relative to the costs of altering a financial
portfolio.4 For example, regulatory oversight and geographic restric-
tions have raised the cost of hostile takeovers in banking, and have
made them rare relative to nonbank industries.5 We recognize that,
in the long run, risk and ownership structure would be determined
simultaneously but assume that, for the relatively short-run period
we analyze, risk adjusts to a fixed ownership and management
structure.
Results
Regression results show that our measures of overall bank risk are
influenced in varying degrees by ownership structure and the diver-
sification of wealth. Credit risk as measured by loan losses and non-
performing assets was clearly tied to ownership structure and
diversification of wealth (Table A1.1), but measures of bank prepara-
tion for bad loans such as allowances and provisions for loans losses
were not (Table A1.2). Of other balance sheet risks, only the equity-
to-asset ratio was significantly related to ownership structure and
diversification of wealth (Table A2). Finally, variation in total income
was not statistically related to either managers bank investment/net
worth or the ownership share of the hired manager, but was nega-
tively related to the monitors bank investment/net worth (regression
(14), Table A3). On the other hand, the survival likelihood index was
significantly related to all three of these variables. Variation in oper-
ating earnings was statistically related to the ownership share of the
hired manager, but not to the managers or monitors bank invest-
ment/net worth (regression (15), Table A3).
3 Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn,  The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and
Consequences, Journal of Political Economy 93 (1985): 1155-77.
4 Saunders et. al., (1990): 645.
5 Stephen D. Prowse, Alternate Methods of Corporate Control in Commercial Banks,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review (Third Quarter 1995): 24-36.
Appendix: Regression Analysis of Risk, Ownership Structure, and Manager
and Ownership Wealth (continued)37
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R2 .0301 .0570 .0301 .0507 .0555
Notes: The sample consists of 267 state-chartered banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District. Reported statistics are coefficient estimates and associated
standard errors.
***, **, and * indicate statistically different from zero at a 1%, 5%, or 10% significance level.
 Tests indicated that the coefficient on this variable was not statistically different from zero, and so the variable was not entered for this regression.38
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Regression analysis of manager wealth, ownership, and credit risk
Dependent Variable
Allowance for Loan
Losses / Total Loans
Provision for Loan
Losses / Total Loans
Other Real Estate
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R2 .0437 .0079 .0407 .0317
Notes: The sample consists of 267 state-chartered banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District. Reported statistics are coefficient estimates and associated
standard errors.
***, **, and * indicate statistically different from zero at a 1%, 5%, or 10% significance level.
Tests indicated that the coefficient on this variable was not statistically different from zero, and so the variable was not entered for this regression.
Table A1.239
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Regression analysis of manager wealth, ownership, and other balance sheet risk
Dependent Variable
Equity / Total assets
























Managers (bank investment/net worth)2 -0.003413*
(.00243)
not entered not entered not entered
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R2 .1239 .1018 .1092 .0418
Notes: The sample consists of 267 state-chartered banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District. Reported statistics are coefficient estimates and associated
standard errors.
***, **, and * indicate statistically different from zero at a 1%, 5%, or 10% significance level.
 Tests indicated that the error terms for this regression were heteroscedastic. We corrected for this by using Whites (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent standard
errors.
 Tests indicated that the coefficient on this variable was not statistically different from zero, and so the variable was not entered for this regression.
Table A240
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Regression analysis of manager wealth, ownership, and measures of overall bank risk
Table A3
Dependent Variable
Total Revenue Variation: Log
(Standard Deviation of Total
Revenue / Average Assets)
Net Earnings Variation: Log
(Standard Deviation of Operating
Return on Average Assets)
Survival Index: Log [(Equity +
Average Operating Return on
Assets) / (Standard Deviation of
Operating Return on Average
Assets)]
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R2 .0667 .0875 .1125
Notes: The sample consists of 267 state-chartered banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District. Reported statistics are coefficient estimates and associated
standard errors.
***,**, and * indicate statistically different from zero at a 1%, 5%, or 10% significance level.
 Tests indicated that the coefficient on this variable was not statistically different from zero, and so the variable was not entered for this regression.